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Federal legislation has been proposed to modify the
National Organ Transplant Act in a way that would
permit government-regulated strategies, including fi-
nancial incentives, to be implemented and evaluated.
The Council and Ethics Committee of the American
Society of Transplant Surgeons conducted a brief web-
based survey of its members’ (n = 449, 41.6% response
rate) views on acceptable or unacceptable strategies
to increase organ donation. The majority of the mem-
bership supports reimbursement for funeral expenses,
an income tax credit on the final return of a de-
ceased donor and an income tax credit for register-
ing as an organ donor as strategies for increasing de-
ceased donation. Payment for lost wages, guaranteed
health insurance and an income tax credit are strate-
gies most strongly supported by the membership to
increase living donation. For both deceased and living
donation, the membership is mostly opposed to cash
payments to donors, their estates or to next-of-kin.
There is strong support for a government-regulated
trial to evaluate the potential benefits and harms of
financial incentives for both deceased and living dona-
tion. Overall, there is strong support within the ASTS
membership for changes to NOTA that would permit
the implementation and careful evaluation of indirect,
government-regulated strategies to increase organ
donation.
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Introduction
Numerous strategies to increase the rates of both de-
ceased and living organ donation consent and procure-
ment have been proposed and debated within the trans-
plant community (1–9). These strategies include income
tax credits for donor registration and for actual donation,
reimbursement for funeral expenses, cash payments to
the donor’s estate and/or family, a charitable contribution
designated by the donor or the next-of-kin, reimbursement
for expenses incurred by the next-of-kin secondary to the
donor’s death, guaranteed health and/or life insurance and
payment for lost wages for living donors.
In large parts, dialogue about the relative merits and limi-
tations of these strategies has been theoretical, inferential
and anecdotal. One exception is Iran, which substantially
reduced its kidney transplant waiting list after implement-
ing a compensated and regulated living-unrelated kidney
donor program (10). There are other examples such as Is-
rael (11) and Singapore (12) where recent legislation has
specified that it is allowable to compensate donors under
certain circumstances but there is no data with which to
judge the efficacy of these new efforts for increasing do-
nation rates. Currently, most developed countries prohibit
any type of monetary compensation for organ donation. In
the United States, for instance, the National Organ Trans-
plant Act (NOTA) prohibits ‘any person to knowingly ac-
quire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for
valuable consideration for use in human transplantation . . .’
(NOTA, Section 274e, 2008) (13). Contemporary interpre-
tations of this clause in NOTA have construed this to mean
that it is illegal to implement any of the potential awards
mentioned above. Although some recent interpretations
suggest that NOTA was never intended to prohibit provi-
sion of government-provided compensation for donors, the
more rigid interpretation has prevailed and consequently
there have been no controlled trials that have specifically
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examined the impact of such strategies on organ donation
rates.
In 2008, two events led the ASTS Council and Ethics Com-
mittee to solicit its membership’s views about government-
regulated strategies to increase organ donation. First, the
Declaration of Istanbul on Organ Trafficking and Transplant
Tourism was published (14). Convened by the Transplanta-
tion Society and the International Society of Nephrology in
Istanbul, Turkey, on April 30–May 2, 2008, this international
summit yielded a document that emphasized the need to
maximize the use of deceased donor organs, the need for
countries with established deceased donor programs (or
living donor, for that matter) to share their knowledge with
countries without these programs, the need to protect vul-
nerable populations from abusive acts, the equitable alloca-
tion of donor organs based on sound ethical principles and
the prevention of organ brokerage and trafficking. While the
ASTS supported these and many other aspects of the Dec-
laration, the Society raised concerns about specific areas in
the Declaration, including the suggestion that health care
insurance be guaranteed to donors and no provisions made
for limited, controlled trials of incentives (15). While ASTS
supports provision of healthcare coverage to donors, this is
not currently a widely applied reality in the United States.
Further, the ASTS has been considering support for pilot
studies of incentives for donation. Second, while some of
the more conservative interpretations of NOTA that have
prevented pilot projects of limited donor compensation to
move forward at the state level (e.g. Pennsylvania initiative
to provide $300 reimbursement toward funeral expenses),
a new piece of legislation was being developed for intro-
duction into the US Senate that would amend NOTA in
a way that would permit government-regulated trials of
donor incentives as a means to increase organ donation
(16).
We designed a brief survey, so that the ASTS can more
effectively represent the views of its members and to as-
certain a broader opinion regarding what are acceptable
and unacceptable measures to stimulate organ donation.
This survey was initially sent out with the caveat that it
was intended for data gathering to inform the stance of
the ASTS and not for publication. In retrospect, ASTS lead-
ership felt that the opinions expressed in the survey were
extremely helpful in formulating the ASTS public stance to
this issue and that the membership would benefit from a
summary report. In this report, we summarize the findings
from the recent ASTS membership survey.
Methods
We designed a brief web-based survey to assess views about government-
regulated strategies to increase organ donation. Questions assessed the
degree of support/opposition (strongly support, support, neutral/undecided,
oppose, strongly oppose) for several government-regulated strategies that
have been suggested to stimulate more deceased and living organ dona-
tion, and for government-regulated trials to evaluate the effectiveness of
financial incentives for deceased and living donation. In addition, we asked
open-ended questions to determine (1) whether respondents strongly sup-
ported other government-regulated strategies to increase deceased or liv-
ing donation that were not identified in the survey, and (2) the reasons why
respondents did not support the proposed legislation (i.e. Organ Donation
Clarification Act of 2008). One of the authors (JR) and a research assis-
tant read each free-text response, identified the major themes, and then
categorized each response according to the themes.
In October 2008, ASTS sent an email to 1,080 members, describing the
study purpose and providing a secure hyperlink (www.surveymonkey.com)
to complete the survey online from October 16 to October 31, 2008. A
reminder email with the secure hyperlink was sent every few days to mem-
bers who had not yet completed the survey. In addition to questions noted
above, we asked respondents to provide their UNOS region, number of
years in and location (United States, other) of practice, profession and pri-
mary organs of practice. No paper copies of the survey were distributed.
Results
During a 1-month period, ASTS collected 449 survey re-
sponses (41.6% response rate). The majority of respon-
dents were surgeons, practicing in the United States,
had less than 15 years of experience in transplantation
and identified abdominal organs as their primary focus of
practice. All UNOS regions were represented (Table 1).
We were unable to collect data about nonresponders, al-
though the sample appears to be representative of the gen-
eral ASTS membership based on professional status (86%
surgeons, 2% physicians), practice location (89% United
States) and geographical representation (i.e. all UNOS re-
gions). The ASTS does not maintain data on years in prac-
tice or primary focus of practice.
Most respondents (74.6%) personally support (strongly
support or support in the survey) the proposed Organ Do-
nation Clarification Act of 2008 (16) as drafted in October
2008 (35.6% strongly support, 39.0% support, 9.6% neu-
tral/undecided, 10.6% oppose, 5.3% strongly oppose) and
believe that ASTS should support this legislation (80.5%).
Among those who did not support the legislation as initially
proposed, the open-ended comments (n = 55) expressed
concerns about the commercialization of an altruistic act
(30%), the possibility of exploitation (24%) and the legis-
lation’s lack of differentiation between deceased and living
donation (13%).
The majority of respondents support one or more
government-regulated strategies to stimulate more de-
ceased organ donation (Table 2). However, there is
considerable variability in what the respondents consider
acceptable strategies. A clear majority support reimburse-
ment for funeral expenses (73.0%), an income tax credit
on the final return for donating organs (66.5%) and an in-
come tax credit for registering as an organ donor (64.5%).
About half the respondents support a contribution to a
charity designated by the deceased or next-of-kin (51.0%)
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Unknown or not applicable 22 (4.9)
UNOS region (US respondents only)
Region 1 36 (9.4)
Region 2 56 (14.6)
Region 3 41 (10.7)
Region 4 28 (7.3)
Region 5 39 (13.7)
Region 6 11 (2.9)
Region 7 34 (8.8)
Region 8 25 (6.5)
Region 9 41 (10.7)
Region 10 36 (9.4)
Region 11 38 (9.9)







Unknown or not applicable 15 (3.3)
a‘Other’ category includes nurse practitioners, physician assis-
tants and allied health professionals.
bColumn percentages sum is >100% because multiple responses
were permitted.
and reimbursement for next-of-kin expenses incurred sec-
ondary to a donor’s death (56.0%). More direct forms of
rewarded gifting are supported only by a minority of re-
spondents (cash payment to the donor’s family, 21.9%,
or to the donor’s estate, 25.8%), with higher rates of
strong opposition than those for any other strategy. Addi-
tional government-regulated strategies strongly supported
and identified by survey respondents in the open-ended
question (n = 66) included presumed consent or opting-
out legislation (38%), higher transplant priority for those
who registered as donors (12%), a national memorial for
donors and a Medal of Honor ceremony for family mem-
bers (9%) and government-mandated organ donation edu-
cation (8%).
Payment for lost wages (76.8%), payment of health insur-
ance premiums (72.0%) and an income tax credit (64.0%)
received the most support as government-regulated strate-
gies to increase living organ donation (Table 3). A slight
majority (55.5%) favored payment of life insurance premi-
ums, while cash payment to the donor was least supported
by respondents (20.1%). A contribution to a charity des-
ignated by the donor received modest support (44.5%),
with a quarter of respondents neutral or undecided about
this strategy. Comments made by respondents (n = 32)
emphasized government-regulated strategies to ensure
that donors are fully reimbursed for direct and indirect ex-
penses associated with donation (31%).
Correlational analyses showed that support for any one
deceased or living donation strategy was positively corre-
lated with support for all other strategies (all rs ≥ 0.34,
p < 0.0001). Also, support for deceased donation strate-
gies was highly correlated with support for living donation
strategies (all rs ≥ 0.35, p < 0.0001). Analyses of variance
showed that support for deceased donation strategies did
not differ by respondent years of practice. However, years
of practice were associated with support for guaranteed
health insurance (F = 2.7, p = 0.02) and life insurance
(F = 2.6, p = 0.02) as strategies for increasing living dona-
tion. Respondents with 11–25 years of practice were more
likely to support these strategies to increase living dona-
tion than those with less (1–5 years) or more (26+ years)
years of transplant experience (ps < 0.05). Finally, Region
4 (Oklahoma, Texas) was significantly less likely to support
cash payment to the deceased donor’s estate (F = 3.2, p <
0.0001) or cash payment to the living donor (F = 2.5, p =
0.005) than the majority of other regions. Relative to all
other regions, Region 6 (Alaska, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana,
Oregon, Washington) was significantly more likely to
support cash payment to living donors.
The majority of respondents personally support a
government-regulated trial to evaluate the potential ef-
fects of financial incentives for both deceased (74.6%)
and living (69.8%) donation, in order to assess the bal-
ance between benefit and harm. A similar proportion be-
lieves ASTS should support such government-regulated
trials (75.5% for deceased donation, 69.6% for living do-
nation). Of those who support such regulated trials, 75.8%
said a trial limited to one UNOS region was more accept-
able than trials limited to one organ procurement organi-
zation (46.0%), one state (41.7%) or one transplant center
(14.0%).
Discussion
Worldwide, the demand for transplantable organs con-
tinues to outpace the supply. This has served as the
catalyst for vigorous debate about both direct (actual
monetary compensation, e.g. cash payment) and indirect
(organs traded for goods or services of cash value, e.g.
2174 American Journal of Transplantation 2009; 9: 2172–2176
ASTS Membership Survey
Table 2: Proportion of respondents who support/oppose implementation of specific government-regulated strategies to stimulate more
deceased organ donation
Strongly Neutral/ Strongly
N support Support undecided Oppose oppose
Income tax credit for registering as an organ donor 444 149 (33.6) 137 (30.9) 65 (14.6) 57 (12.8) 36 (8.1)
Income tax credit (via final return) for donating
organs
439 170 (38.7) 122 (27.8) 54 (12.3) 61 (13.9) 32 (7.3)
Reimbursement for funeral expenses 438 185 (42.2) 135 (30.8) 50 (11.4) 45 (10.3) 23 (5.3)
Cash payment to the donor’s estate 435 60 (13.8) 52 (12.0) 96 (22.1) 139 (32.0) 88 (20.2)
Cash payment to the donor’s family 434 51 (11.8) 44 (10.1) 78 (18.0) 151 (34.8) 110 (25.3)
Contribution to a charity designated by the
deceased or legal next-of-kin
439 97 (22.1) 127 (28.9) 106 (24.1) 75 (17.1) 34 (7.7)
Reimbursement of travel and lodging expenses
incurred by the family in conjunction with the
donor’s death
440 123 (28.0) 123 (28.0) 91 (20.7) 65 (14.8) 38 (8.6)
funeral expense voucher, health insurance, contribution
to a designated charity) strategies to increase deceased
and living organ donation rates. The recent Declaration
of Istanbul recognizes that provision of long-term health
care for living donors is essential, but it does not pro-
vide explicit support for donor incentives. However, ASTS
members we surveyed overwhelmingly support legisla-
tion that would clarify the NOTA to permit government-
regulated trials of donor incentives in the United States.
Survey findings highlight a clear preference for certain
forms of incentives (funeral expense reimbursement, in-
come tax credits, payment of lost wages) over others
(direct cash payments to donors or their surviving fam-
ily members). This latter finding is generally consistent
with an ASTS-convened panel of ethicists, organ dona-
tion and transplant professionals, and public policy experts
who supported the use of a funeral expense reimburse-
ment as ethically permissible, but who strongly opposed
direct cash payments (1). Members of the International
Society of Heart and Lung Transplantation and the Foun-
dation for the Advancement of Cardiac Therapies similarly
preferred indirect (70%) versus direct (34%) compensation
(17).
The debate about whether reward strategies would in-
crease or decrease organ donation rates, or have no ef-
fect at all, has been stymied by the lack of any substantial
data from controlled trials. While surveys of the general
public, transplant patients and providers, other interested
parties (policy makers, ethicists) and donor family mem-
bers shape the debate to some degree (17–22), appropri-
ately controlled and representative trials would provide the
systematic data that heretofore have been prohibited by
federal statutes. Our survey findings show strong support
within the ASTS membership for changes to NOTA that
would permit implementation of government-regulated
strategies using indirect financial incentives to stimulate
both deceased and living donation rates and strong op-
position to implementation of direct financial incentives
such as cash payments to the live donor or the family of
the deceased donor. Additionally, our survey findings show
strong support for government-regulated trials for all finan-
cial incentives to assess the balance between benefit and
harm, using such trials that are inclusive and geographically
representative.
One limitation of our findings and their interpretation is the
issue of response bias. While survey respondents were
generally representative of the ASTS membership, it is
possible that those who responded to the survey were
those who felt most passionately (pro or con) about dona-
tion stimulus. Moreover, the ASTS does not maintain data
on its membership in a way that would allow us to com-
pare the study sample to the general membership on all
demographic characteristics (e.g. years in practice, primary
organ).
Table 3: Proportion of respondents who support/oppose implementation of specific government-regulated strategies to stimulate more
living organ donation
Strongly Neutral/ Strongly
N support Support undecided Oppose oppose
Income tax credit 437 157 (35.9) 123 (28.1) 51 (11.7) 60 (13.7) 46 (10.5)
Cash payment to the donor 431 45 (10.4) 42 (9.7) 79 (18.3) 140 (32.5) 125 (29.0)
Contribution to a charity designated by the donor 429 79 (18.4) 112 (26.1) 111 (25.9) 78 (18.2) 49 (11.4)
Guaranteed health insurance (premiums paid) 439 172 (39.2) 144 (32.8) 45 (10.3) 48 (10.9) 30 (6.9)
Guaranteed life insurance (premiums paid) 434 132 (30.4) 109 (25.1) 79 (18.2) 78 (18.0) 36 (8.3)
Payment for lost wages 436 188 (43.1) 147 (33.7) 59 (13.5) 20 (4.6) 22 (5.0)
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